How Beijing can make reunification more appealing for Taiwanese

With a ‘one country, two systems’ formula out of favour, Beijing may need to think outside the box and spell out a more liberal and accommodative constitutional package

Andrew Leung

Published: 5:30am, 25 Jan, 2024

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With the unprecedented third election victory of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and Beijing branding president-elect William Lai Ching-te an “obstinate Taiwan-independence worker”, two questions are being asked: Can peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait can be maintained? And is achieving unification by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China’s centenary, still a realistic idea?

As of June last year, according to a long-running poll by Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, only about 6 per cent of Taiwanese surveyed supported either unification or independence as soon as possible, while nearly 88 per cent wanted to maintain the status quo.

In the book US-Taiwan Relations: Will China’s Challenge Lead to a Crisis, authors Ryan Hass, Bonnie Glaser and Richard Bush expound on the official US position on Taiwan. America’s one-China policy is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, three joint communiques and “six assurances”.

The Taiwan Relations Act authorises arming Taiwan to defend against any non-peaceful solution of the Taiwan question. The three joint communiques confirm the normalisation of relations with Beijing under the one-China policy. First conveyed by the Reagan administration, the “six assurances” for Taiwan explain that the United States had not taken any position on Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan, would not play a mediation role and would not end arms sales to Taiwan any time soon.

The authors stress that America’s policy is designed to preserve Taiwan’s democratic success story and the credibility of America’s security commitments without triggering conflict, while providing the time and space for an eventual peaceful solution that is acceptable to Taiwan’s people.

Accordingly, Taiwan is to be accorded all the elbow room it needs as a flourishing democracy, where independent nationhood is not a prerequisite.

The US State Department has “contact guidelines” which loosely define what interactions between the US and Taiwan governments are permitted, and what would be considered unofficial contact, even if sometimes at odds with Beijing’s position. Constitutionally, Congress is not bound by these guidelines and this can result in controversy, such as former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022.

Taiwan has become a globally important strategic asset by way of its dominance in high-end semiconductor chips – the new “oil” of the Fourth Industrial Revolution that is redefining commerce, human interaction and geopolitics.

Perhaps more importantly, as Columbia University professor Howard French points out in Foreign Policy, if Beijing were to take over the island, its navy and other military forces would have free rein in the Western Pacific, eclipsing US influence and power in that important theatre, with all that it implies.

It’s no wonder the US is trying to turn the island into a military “porcupine” even as it steps up its “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea. Amid US-China rivalry, the Taiwan card is likely to be played over and again, with the US seeming to see the island as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”.

In Beijing’s eyes, with Taiwan being helped to play a more prominent role as an entity independent in all but name from mainland China, America’s one-China policy is in danger of being hollowed out.

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Beijing enacted its Anti-Secession Law in 2005. A panoply of military assets has since been deployed to deter Taiwan’s de jure independence, such as “aircraft-carrier killer” missiles, and assets with “anti-access and area denial” capabilities.

China has the world’s largest naval fleet, with three aircraft carriers and fortified islands in the South China Sea. Still, should push comes to shove, any full-scale amphibious military operation would be a hazardous enterprise, risking a regional, if not world, war.

In particular, the 130km-wide Taiwan Strait is almost four times the width of the English Channel, and Taiwan has very few sites suitable for coastal amphibious landings.

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Nor would a full-fledged blockade of Taiwan be a less perilous operation, considering America’s regional network of military alliances, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (with Japan, Australia and India), the Aukus nuclear submarine pact (with Australia and Britain) and the defence partnership with Japan and South Korea, not to mention the support of Nato members such as France and Germany.

Beijing has published three white papers on Taiwan, the last in August 2022, all stressing its preference for a peaceful unification, with the military option as the very last resort.

Meanwhile, cross-strait exchanges are increasing. An estimated one to two million Taiwanese live and work on the mainland. Bilateral tourism continues to flourish. More Taiwanese film directors, actors and actresses are making their cut on the mainland, as are Taiwanese start-ups.

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Most Taiwanese do not want de jure independence for its own sake. Unification has become very unpopular because the vast majority deeply cherish their political system and way of life, according to an analysis by the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank.

The “one country, two systems” formula proposed by Beijing – and practised in Hong Kong – has lost all traction with the Taiwanese people after recent years. Beijing, it seems, has yet to offer the Taiwanese something so appealing that they don’t want to refuse it.

To induce Taiwan to negotiations, Beijing may need to spell out a more liberal and accommodative constitutional package, preserving not only Taiwan’s way of life but also its political system, including free and fair elections for its leader and legislature, with measures to help the island expand its presence in the mainland and internationally, playing a full role as Taiwan (China), including membership of organisations not requiring nationhood.

As the years go by, if the Chinese dream of a peaceful unification is not to slip away, Beijing will have to think outside the box.

Andrew K.P. Leung is an independent China strategist. [email protected]